Table of Contents
- Overview — p.3
- Part I — China's Rise (p.8): China's Rise · Change and Instability in the System · Silk Road (in a Chainmail Fist) · Australia Wakes Up · Wolf Warrior Diplomacy · PRC Operations in the "COVID moment"
- Part II — The Third Offset Strategy? (p.29): Great Power Conflict and return to Major Conventional War · Not All War is About the Gun · War v Warfare · Cloaked Power
- Part III — War Plan Black (p.43): Grand Strategy · Military Strategy · Offensive Operations · Mission · Organization · Conclusion
Chapter 1
Introduction — A Return to Ungentlemanly Warfare
What do special operations in contested and denied environments in Asia look like in the context of great power competition?
Washington is very trend-conscious. The new acronyms on everyone's lips: GPC, MCW, TOS. Great Power Competition will inevitably lead to Major Conventional War, which can be won by the Third Offset Strategy. GPC, MCW, TOS promise a return to what America does best — big wars.
It is certainly counter-cultural to suggest that a coming MCW will not depend on US conventional capabilities. But as this book details, conventional warfare is a secondary consideration in GPC because China, Russia, Iran, and al Qaeda choose not to practice it. GPF are not where the main effort lies. They are a blocking force. The tackling, penetration, and scoring remains a task for special operations forces.
It follows that if great powers engaged in competition with the US refrain from use of GPFs in favor of the full gamut of unrestricted methods available to them — which they have — then USSOF must remain the primary driver of American efforts to counter malign influences flooding the world.
About the Author
Adam C PhD (Cantab) served as a Principal Strategist for USSOCOM where he was involved in designing clandestine war plans for special mission units. He earned a PhD under Sir Harry Hinsley (wartime codebreaker and official historian of British Intelligence in WWII) at St John's College, Cambridge. Over more than a decade he served with distinction as a professor of strategy at the United States Air War College, the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the United States Naval War College. At Newport, Adam was Director of a classified US Navy intel-planning-ops cell dedicated to assessing future enemy WMD concepts of operations — unique in the US Government in combining activities across the J2, J3, and J5 for US Strategic Command, USSOCOM, and US Pacific Command.